Tuesday, February 11, 2014

Novant Health Forsyth Medical Center Information on potential CJD exposure

February 11, 2014 UPDATE

Novant Health Forsyth Medical Center Information on potential CJD exposure

Information on potential CJD exposure

Novant Health Forsyth Medical Center is sharing information about the exposure of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, or CJD, to 18 patients who had neurosurgery at the hospital. According to the CDC, the risk of transmission from surgery is remote and the last reported case of surgical transmission was in 1976.

It is believed that CJD affects about one person in every one million people per year worldwide. In the United States there are about 300 cases per year. It is important to note that there are multiple variations of CJD and this case is not related to mad cow disease.

Although the risk of getting the disease is very low, Novant Health believes it is important to share this information with patients, family members, and the community. Patients who underwent neurosurgery and were exposed already have been contacted directly by Novant Health.

On January 18, 2014, a medical team at Novant Health Forsyth Medical Center performed a procedure on a patient with a neurological condition. Subsequently, the medical center was notified that lab results confirmed that the patient had CJD. Although the surgical instruments used during the patient’s surgery were sterilized using standard procedures for cleaning surgical instruments, they were not subjected to enhanced sterilization procedures necessary on instruments used in confirmed or suspected cases of CJD.

The patient had neurological symptoms that could have been attributed to CJD or another brain disease. Our standard procedure is to apply the enhanced sterilization process to surgical instruments that are used on any patient who is suspected or confirmed of having CJD in order to prevent possible transmission. There were reasons to suspect that this patient might have had CJD. As such, the extra precautions should have been taken, but were not.

Since then, Novant Health Forsyth Medical Center has identified 18 patients who were exposed to the disease during brain surgery. We believed it was our duty to inform those patients who were exposed during surgery.

"The risk to these individuals is remote," said Jim Lederer, MD, Novant Health VP clinical improvement. "However, we cannot say there is no risk and therefore it is our obligation to notify patients and provide them with information and support. Our first concern is for our patients who are recovering from surgery and may now need additional support.”

Following the CJD confirmation, Novant Health Forsyth Medical Center instituted the enhanced sterilization process on all surgical instruments used in brain surgery. In addition, the hospital is following CDC recommendations and guidelines and working with state and local health officials to ensure the facility is taking necessary precautions to prevent this in the future.

Questions about CJD and this incident may be directed to our toll-free number 877-463-4052.

 
News media inquiries, please call 336-287-4203.

 

 
Greetings Novant Health et al,

AS bad as this is, I applaud your efforts to contact the exposed, and help prevent further exposure. I only hope that you really consider disposable instruments for future use, when at all possible. I also hope that you offer free follow-up and trace forward for any further medical and dental procedures for these exposed, for the next 50 YEARS.
 
I wish to submit the following on the Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease CJD TSE prion disease and the iatrogenic aspects of it i.e. friendly fire.

I am a layperson, I lost my mother to the Heidenhain Variant of Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease hvCJD December 14, 1997, and just made a promise, never forget, and never let them forget.

here is the latest TSE prion science, please use as you wish.

good luck with this incident. ...

with sad regards, I am sincerely,

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

 
Inactivation of the TSE Prion disease

Chronic Wasting Disease CWD, and other TSE prion disease, these TSE prions know no borders.

these TSE prions know no age restrictions.

The TSE prion disease survives ashing to 600 degrees celsius, that’s around 1112 degrees farenheit.

you cannot cook the TSE prion disease out of meat.

you can take the ash and mix it with saline and inject that ash into a mouse, and the mouse will go down with TSE.

Prion Infected Meat-and-Bone Meal Is Still Infectious after Biodiesel Production as well.

the TSE prion agent also survives Simulated Wastewater Treatment Processes.

IN fact, you should also know that the TSE Prion agent will survive in the environment for years, if not decades.

you can bury it and it will not go away.

The TSE agent is capable of infected your water table i.e. Detection of protease-resistant cervid prion protein in water from a CWD-endemic area.

it’s not your ordinary pathogen you can just cook it out and be done with. that’s what’s so worrisome about Iatrogenic mode of transmission, a simple autoclave will not kill this TSE prion agent.

New studies on the heat resistance of hamster-adapted scrapie agent: Threshold survival after ashing at 600°C suggests an inorganic template of replication

The infectious agents responsible for transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) are notoriously resistant to most physical and chemical methods used for inactivating pathogens, including heat. It has long been recognized, for example, that boiling is ineffective and that higher temperatures are most efficient when combined with steam under pressure (i.e., autoclaving). As a means of decontamination, dry heat is used only at the extremely high temperatures achieved during incineration, usually in excess of 600°C. It has been assumed, without proof, that incineration totally inactivates the agents of TSE, whether of human or animal origin.


 
Prion Infected Meat-and-Bone Meal Is Still Infectious after Biodiesel Production

Histochemical analysis of hamster brains inoculated with the solid residue showed typical spongiform degeneration and vacuolation. Re-inoculation of these brains into a new cohort of hamsters led to onset of clinical scrapie symptoms within 75 days, suggesting that the specific infectivity of the prion protein was not changed during the biodiesel process. The biodiesel reaction cannot be considered a viable prion decontamination method for MBM, although we observed increased survival time of hamsters and reduced infectivity greater than 6 log orders in the solid MBM residue. Furthermore, results from our study compare for the first time prion detection by Western Blot versus an infectivity bioassay for analysis of biodiesel reaction products. We could show that biochemical analysis alone is insufficient for detection of prion infectivity after a biodiesel process.


Detection of protease-resistant cervid prion protein in water from a CWD-endemic area

The data presented here demonstrate that sPMCA can detect low levels of PrPCWD in the environment, corroborate previous biological and experimental data suggesting long term persistence of prions in the environment2,3 and imply that PrPCWD accumulation over time may contribute to transmission of CWD in areas where it has been endemic for decades. This work demonstrates the utility of sPMCA to evaluate other environmental water sources for PrPCWD, including smaller bodies of water such as vernal pools and wallows, where large numbers of cervids congregate and into which prions from infected animals may be shed and concentrated to infectious levels.



A Quantitative Assessment of the Amount of Prion Diverted to Category 1 Materials and Wastewater During Processing

Keywords:Abattoir;bovine spongiform encephalopathy;QRA;scrapie;TSE


In this article the development and parameterization of a quantitative assessment is described that estimates the amount of TSE infectivity that is present in a whole animal carcass (bovine spongiform encephalopathy [BSE] for cattle and classical/atypical scrapie for sheep and lambs) and the amounts that subsequently fall to the floor during processing at facilities that handle specified risk material (SRM). BSE in cattle was found to contain the most oral doses, with a mean of 9864 BO ID50s (310, 38840) in a whole carcass compared to a mean of 1851 OO ID50s (600, 4070) and 614 OO ID50s (155, 1509) for a sheep infected with classical and atypical scrapie, respectively. Lambs contained the least infectivity with a mean of 251 OO ID50s (83, 548) for classical scrapie and 1 OO ID50s (0.2, 2) for atypical scrapie. The highest amounts of infectivity falling to the floor and entering the drains from slaughtering a whole carcass at SRM facilities were found to be from cattle infected with BSE at rendering and large incineration facilities with 7.4 BO ID50s (0.1, 29), intermediate plants and small incinerators with a mean of 4.5 BO ID50s (0.1, 18), and collection centers, 3.6 BO ID50s (0.1, 14). The lowest amounts entering drains are from lambs infected with classical and atypical scrapie at intermediate plants and atypical scrapie at collection centers with a mean of 3 × 10−7 OO ID50s (2 × 10−8, 1 × 10−6) per carcass. The results of this model provide key inputs for the model in the companion paper published here.


 
PPo4-4:

Survival and Limited Spread of TSE Infectivity after Burial

Karen Fernie, Allister Smith and Robert A. Somerville The Roslin Institute and R(D)SVS; University of Edinburgh; Roslin, Scotland UK

Scrapie and chronic wasting disease probably spread via environmental routes, and there are also concerns about BSE infection remaining in the environment after carcass burial or waste 3disposal. In two demonstration experiments we are determining survival and migration of TSE infectivity when buried for up to five years, as an uncontained point source or within bovine heads. Firstly boluses of TSE infected mouse brain were buried in lysimeters containing either sandy or clay soil. Migration from the boluses is being assessed from soil cores taken over time. With the exception of a very small amount of infectivity found 25 cm from the bolus in sandy soil after 12 months, no other infectivity has been detected up to three years. Secondly, ten bovine heads were spiked with TSE infected mouse brain and buried in the two soil types. Pairs of heads have been exhumed annually and assessed for infectivity within and around them. After one year and after two years, infectivity was detected in most intracranial samples and in some of the soil samples taken from immediately surrounding the heads. The infectivity assays for the samples in and around the heads exhumed at years three and four are underway. These data show that TSE infectivity can survive burial for long periods but migrates slowly. Risk assessments should take into account the likely long survival rate when infected material has been buried.

 The authors gratefully acknowledge funding from DEFRA.



PPo3-22:

Detection of Environmentally Associated PrPSc on a Farm with Endemic Scrapie

Ben C. Maddison,1 Claire A. Baker,1 Helen C. Rees,1 Linda A. Terry,2 Leigh Thorne,2 Susan J. Belworthy2 and Kevin C. Gough3 1ADAS-UK LTD; Department of Biology; University of Leicester; Leicester, UK; 2Veterinary Laboratories Agency; Surry, KT UK; 3Department of Veterinary Medicine and Science; University of Nottingham; Sutton Bonington, Loughborough UK

Key words: scrapie, evironmental persistence, sPMCA

Ovine scrapie shows considerable horizontal transmission, yet the routes of transmission and specifically the role of fomites in transmission remain poorly defined. Here we present biochemical data demonstrating that on a scrapie-affected sheep farm, scrapie prion contamination is widespread. It was anticipated at the outset that if prions contaminate the environment that they would be there at extremely low levels, as such the most sensitive method available for the detection of PrPSc, serial Protein Misfolding Cyclic Amplification (sPMCA), was used in this study. We investigated the distribution of environmental scrapie prions by applying ovine sPMCA to samples taken from a range of surfaces that were accessible to animals and could be collected by use of a wetted foam swab. Prion was amplified by sPMCA from a number of these environmental swab samples including those taken from metal, plastic and wooden surfaces, both in the indoor and outdoor environment. At the time of sampling there had been no sheep contact with these areas for at least 20 days prior to sampling indicating that prions persist for at least this duration in the environment. These data implicate inanimate objects as environmental reservoirs of prion infectivity which are likely to contribute to disease transmission.


 

Wednesday, July 10, 2013

Rapid assessment of bovine spongiform encephalopathy prion inactivation by heat treatment in yellow grease produced in the industrial manufacturing process of meat and bone meals

BMC Veterinary Research 2013, 9:134 doi:10.1186/1746-6148-9-134


 

now that I have your attention, please read on for the rest of this man made nightmare. ...tss

 

Thursday, February 06, 2014

Commons Science and Technology Committee announce new inquiry on blood, tissue and organ screening Parliament exposure vcjd and blood risk while still ignoring recent risks factors of sporadic CJD


 
Wednesday, January 15, 2014

*** INFECTION PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF CJD, VCJD AND OTHER HUMAN PRION DISEASES IN HEALTHCARE AND COMMUNITY SETTINGS Variably Protease-Sensitive Prionopathy (VPSPr) January 15, 2014


 
Wednesday, November 27, 2013

NHS failed to sterilise surgical instruments contaminated with 'mad cow' disease


 

Friday, January 10, 2014

vpspr, sgss, sffi, TSE, an iatrogenic by-product of gss, ffi, familial type prion disease, what it ???


 
Thursday, January 23, 2014

Medical Devices Containing Materials Derived from Animal Sources (Except for In Vitro Diagnostic Devices) [Docket No. FDA–2013–D–1574]


 

Saturday, November 16, 2013

Management of neurosurgical instruments and patients exposed to creutzfeldt-jakob disease 2013 December

Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol.


 

Thursday, November 14, 2013

Prion diseases in humans: Oral and dental implications


 

Saturday, November 2, 2013

Recommendation of the Swiss Expert Committee for Biosafety on the classification of activities using prion genes and prion protein January 2013


 

Thursday, January 16, 2014

The Anspach Effort, Inc. RECALL FDA Blackmax motor had been used in a case where the patient was diagnosed with Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease (CJD) MARYLAND HOSTPITAL


 

WHAT about the sporadic CJD TSE proteins ?

WE now know that some cases of sporadic CJD are linked to atypical BSE and atypical Scrapie, so why are not MORE concerned about the sporadic CJD, and all it’s sub-types $$$

Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease CJD cases rising North America updated report August 2013

*** Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease CJD cases rising North America with Canada seeing an extreme increase of 48% between 2008 and 2010 ***


 

Sunday, October 13, 2013

*** CJD TSE Prion Disease Cases in Texas by Year, 2003-2012


 

Sunday, January 19, 2014

National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined1 as of January 8, 2014


 
Thursday, January 17, 2013

TSE guidance, surgical, dental, blood risk factors, Part 4 Infection control of CJD, vCJD and other human prion diseases in healthcare and community settings (updated January 2013)


 

Tuesday, September 24, 2013

NORDION (US), INC., AND BIOAXONE BIOSCIENCES, INC., Settles $90M Mad Cow TSE prion Contamination Suit Cethrin(R)

Case 0:12-cv-60739-RNS Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/26/2012 Page 1 of 15


 

Thursday, September 05, 2013

Possible Patient Exposure to Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Announced New Hampshire DHHS

Press Release


 

Friday, July 19, 2013

Beaumont Hospital in Dublin assessing patients for CJD


 

Tuesday, July 31, 2012

11 patients may have been exposed to fatal disease Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease CJD Greenville Memorial Hospital


 

Thursday, August 02, 2012

CJD case in Saint John prompts letter to patients Canada CJD case in Saint John prompts letter to patients


 

Saturday, February 12, 2011

Another Pathologists dies from CJD, another potential occupational death ?

another happenstance of bad luck, a spontaneous event from nothing, or friendly fire ???


 

Thursday, April 12, 2012

 
Health professions and risk of sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease, 1965 to 2010

 
Eurosurveillance, Volume 17, Issue 15, 12 April 2012

 

Research articles

 
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/04/health-professions-and-risk-of-sporadic.html

 

Wednesday, February 16, 2011

IN CONFIDENCE SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION TO CHIMPANZEES IN CONFIDENCE


 

Sunday, December 12, 2010

EFSA reviews BSE/TSE infectivity in small ruminant tissues News Story 2 December 2010


 

Sunday, April 18, 2010

SCRAPIE AND ATYPICAL SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION STUDIES A REVIEW 2010


 

Sunday, February 2, 2014

The Presence of Disease-Associated Prion Protein in Skeletal Muscle of Cattle Infected with Classical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

NOTE Pathology


 

Monday, February 10, 2014

Enhanced Virulence of Sheep-Passaged Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Agent Is Revealed by Decreased Polymorphism Barriers in Prion Protein Conversion Studies


 

Thursday, August 12, 2010

Seven main threats for the future linked to prions

First threat

The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed.

***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.

Second threat

snip...


 
EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story

 
This is an interesting editorial about the Mad Cow Disease debacle, and it's ramifications that will continue to play out for decades to come ;

Monday, October 10, 2011

 

EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story

 

snip...

 

EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far __but__ the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded. Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.

 

snip...

 


 


 

 see follow-up here about North America BSE Mad Cow TSE prion risk factors, and the ever emerging strains of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy in many species here in the USA, including humans ;

 


 

 I remember a case of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: implications for gastroenterology & CJD 38 years after _diagnostic_ use of hGH (Iatrogenic CJDs & sporadic CJDs) (see below);

 

We describe the second patient with hGH related CJD in the Netherlands. The patient developed the disease 38 years after hGH injections. To our knowledge, this is the longest incubation period described for any form of iatrogentic CJD. Furthermore, our patient was _not_ treated with hGH, but only received a _low_ dose as part of a diagnostic procedure. (see full text below).

 


 

 

 

Published March 26, 2003

 

RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States

 

Terry S. Singeltary, retired (medically)

 

I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to comment on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging forms of CJD. Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. However, CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be made reportable in every state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs in the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey by intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly expose others. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?

 

Published March 26, 2003

 


 

 

Letters

 

JAMA. 2001;285(6):733-734. doi: 10.1001/jama.285.6.733

 

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

 

Terry S. Singeltary, Sr Bacliff, Tex

 

Since this article does not have an abstract, we have provided the first 150 words of the full text.

 

KEYWORDS: creutzfeldt-jakob disease, diagnosis. To the Editor: In their Research Letter, Dr Gibbons and colleagues1 reported that the annual US death rate due to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) has been stable since 1985. These estimates, however, are based only on reported cases, and do not include misdiagnosed or preclinical cases. It seems to me that misdiagnosis alone would drastically change these figures. An unknown number of persons with a diagnosis of Alzheimer disease in fact may have CJD, although only a small number of these patients receive the postmortem examination necessary to make this diagnosis. Furthermore, only a few states have made CJD reportable. Human and animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathies should be reportable nationwide and internationally.

 

References 1. Gibbons RV, Holman RC, Belay ED, Schonberger LB. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States: 1979-1998. JAMA. 2000;284:2322-2323.

 


 

 

 

14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -

 

Final Abstract Number: ISE.114

 

Session: International Scientific Exchange

 

Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009

 

T. Singeltary

 

Bacliff, TX, USA

 

Background:

 

An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.

 

Methods:

 

12 years independent research of available data

 

Results:

 

I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.

 

Conclusion:

 

I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.

 

 


 

 

 

CJD Singeltary submission to PLOS ;

 

No competing interests declared.

 

see full text ;

 


 


 


 

 

Wednesday, May 16, 2012

 

Alzheimer’s disease and Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy prion disease, Iatrogenic, what if ?

 

Background

 

Alzheimer’s disease and Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy disease have both been around a long time, and was discovered in or around the same time frame, early 1900’s. Both diseases are incurable and debilitating brain disease, that are in the end, 100% fatal, with the incubation/clinical period of the Alzheimer’s disease being longer (most of the time) than the TSE prion disease. Symptoms are very similar, and pathology is very similar.

 

Methods

 

Through years of research, as a layperson, of peer review journals, transmission studies, and observations of loved ones and friends that have died from both Alzheimer’s and the TSE prion disease i.e. Heidenhain Variant Creutzfelt Jakob Disease CJD.

 

Results

 

I propose that Alzheimer’s is a TSE disease of low dose, slow, and long incubation disease, and that Alzheimer’s is Transmissible, and is a threat to the public via the many Iatrogenic routes and sources. It was said long ago that the only thing that disputes this, is Alzheimer’s disease transmissibility, or the lack of. The likelihood of many victims of Alzheimer’s disease from the many different Iatrogenic routes and modes of transmission as with the TSE prion disease.

 

Conclusions

 

There should be a Global Congressional Science round table event set up immediately to address these concerns from the many potential routes and sources of the TSE prion disease, including Alzheimer’s disease, and a emergency global doctrine put into effect to help combat the spread of Alzheimer’s disease via the medical, surgical, dental, tissue, and blood arena’s. All human and animal TSE prion disease, including Alzheimer’s should be made reportable in every state, and Internationally, WITH NO age restrictions. Until a proven method of decontamination and autoclaving is proven, and put forth in use universally, in all hospitals and medical, surgical arena’s, or the TSE prion agent will continue to spread. IF we wait until science and corporate politicians wait until politics lets science _prove_ this once and for all, and set forth regulations there from, we will all be exposed to the TSE Prion agents, if that has not happened already.

 

 

end...tss

 

 

SEE FULL TEXT AND SOURCE REFERENCES ;

 

Wednesday, May 16, 2012

 

Alzheimer’s disease and Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy prion disease, Iatrogenic, what if ?

 

Proposal ID: 29403

 


 

Friday, January 31, 2014

 

Confidentiality in preclinical Alzheimer disease studies

 


 

Wednesday, December 11, 2013

 

*** Detection of Infectivity in Blood of Persons with Variant and Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease ***

 


 

 

Monday, February 10, 2014

 

18 Forsyth Medical Center patients exposed to CJD; apology issued...OOOPS, SORRY, TOO BAD $$$

 


 

 

 

layperson

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

P.O. Box 42

Bacliff, Texas USA 77518


 

never break a promise to your mom...tss