Friday, August 07, 2009

CJD Human Cornea Tissue, Recall END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 5, 2009

PRODUCT Human Cornea Tissue, Recall # B-1129-09 CODE Units: CM109415 OS and CM109415 OD RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Illinois Eye Bank, Watson Gailey, Bloomington, IL, by telephone and letter dated on October 9, 2008. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Donor history indicated increased risk factors for Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease. Tissues had been distributed for transplantation. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 2 corneas DISTRIBUTION IL ___________________________________

PRODUCT Recovered Plasma, Recall # B-1280-09 CODE Unit: W127808401598 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Tacoma Pierce County Blood Bank, Tacoma, WA, by email on March 25, 2009. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Blood product, collected from a donor considered to be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), was distributed. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 1 unit DISTRIBUTION Switzerland ___________________________________

PRODUCT Plasma Frozen, Recall # B-1301-09 CODE Units: F00493, F00111, R19438 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Blood Center of Northcentral Wisconsin, Inc., Wausau, WI, by facsimile on May 12, 2009. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Blood products, collected from a donor who was at risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 3 units DISTRIBUTION NY ___________________________________



Volume 3 No 28; 17 July 2009

HPR Home Archives 2009 news

Revision to pre-surgical assessment of risk for vCJD in neurosurgery and eye surgery units

Pandemic flu: UK situation at 16 July 2009

Revision to pre-surgical assessment of risk for vCJD in neurosurgery and eye surgery units

Patients are routinely assessed prior to undergoing surgical or neuro-endoscopy procedures to determine whether they may have an increased risk of CJD infection. If this is the case, special infection control precautions should be followed [1].

This pre-surgical assessment process has been revised to fully take account of the latest knowledge of variant CJD (vCJD). Now patients undergoing high risk surgery [2] or neuro-endoscopy should be assessed to identify those who have received transfusions from 80 or more donors since 1980. Any patients so identified have an increased risk of vCJD, and special infection control procedures should be followed. It is estimated that around 50 patients will be identified in this way in the UK each year.

Hospitals are being asked to collate blood transfusion histories for these patients, and conduct risk assessments for patients with uncertain or incomplete transfusion histories. Patients who are found to have an increased risk of vCJD will need to be informed via the HPA Centre for Infections CJD section, which is coordinating the implementation of the revised guidance, and their GP.

The vCJD risk to these patients is uncertain, and depends on the prevalence of subclinical vCJD infection among blood donors, the infectivity in the blood of infected donors, and the number of donors the patients have received blood from.

The HPA's CfI-CJD section should be informed of any patients who are identified prior to high risk surgery or neuro-endoscopy as having received blood from 80 or more donors. Health Protection Units have been asked to ensure that infection control teams are aware of the revised guidance.

Information for healthcare workers and patients is available at:


1. Department of Health. "Assessment to be carried out before surgery and/or endoscopy to identify patients with, or at increased risk of, CJD or vCJD" (Annex J of ACDP TSE Working Group guidance).

2. High risk surgery is defined as surgery involving any of the following organs or tissues (high risk tissues): brain, spinal cord, dura mater, cranial nerves (specifically the entire optic nerve and only the intracranial components of the other cranial nerves), cranial nerve ganglia, posterior eye (specifically the posterior hyaloid face, retina, retinal pigment epithelium, choroid, subretinal fluid, optic nerve) and pituitary gland.

Pandemic flu: UK situation at 16 July 2009

The latest HPA Weekly Pandemic Flu Update [1] notes the following developments as at 16 July:

GP consultation rates in England for individuals presenting with flu-like illness showed increased rates, well above the threshold level for normal seasonal flu activity; the under-fives and 5-14 year olds are the age groups predominantly affected; the majority of cases continue to be mild, but there had been 26 deaths in England as at 16 July; and HPA estimated that there were 55,000 new cases of swine flu during the previous week (within a possible range of 30,000 to 85,000). Following the move away from laboratory testing for confirmation of swine flu cases to clinical diagnosis [2], the level of influenza in the community is being monitored using a range of surveillance mechanisms. One of these is the collaborative project between the HPA and the University of Nottingham Division of Primary Care known as QSurveillance®. This is a not-for-profit network over 3,300 general practices covering a total population of almost 22 million patients (more than 25% of the UK population). In the week-ending 12 July, the flu-like illness weekly consultation rate recorded by QSurveillance® reached 86.8 per 100,000, higher than the peak activity in winter 08/09 (see figure 2 in the HPA Weekly Pandemic Flu Update for 16 July [1]).

Given that laboratory testing is no longer routinely recommended, figure 1 (below) graphically illustrates how primary care surveillance such as QSurveillance® is providing a good comparator to laboratory confirmation, showing daily reporting of laboratory confirmed cases alongside daily primary care surveillance reports for flu-like illness.

Figure 1: Comparison of daily laboratory confirmed H1N1v case reports and daily QSurveillance® reports of influenza-like illness, UK*

* Data source: QSurveillance (daily data). Database version 1. Copyright QRESEARCH 2009.

Department of Health guidance: the National Pandemic Flu Service

In view of the very high demand for primary care, NHS Direct and A and E services in many areas, the Department of Health announced plans to activate, subject to rigorous testing, the National Pandemic Flu Service before the end of July [3].


1. "Weekly pandemic flu update (16 July 2009)", (HPA press release of 16 July 2009). HPA website: National Press Releases.

2. “Treatment approach announced for pandemic flu”, Health Protection Report [serial online] 2009; 3 (26): news. Available at:

3. Department of Health. “National Pandemic Flu Service”, 17 July 2009

Saturday, May 23, 2009

Latest results of HPA study on vCJD-related abnormal prion proteins in extracted tonsil

Wednesday, August 20, 2008

Tonometer disinfection practice in the United Kingdom: A national survey

Wednesday, January 02, 2008

Risk factors for sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease

Sunday, December 16, 2007

Risk factors for sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease

Monday, December 31, 2007

Risk Assessment of Transmission of Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in Endodontic Practice in Absence of Adequate Prion Inactivation

Eye procedure raises CJD concerns November 19, 2004 United Press International by STEVE MITCHELL

A New York man who died from a rare brain disorder similar to mad cow disease in May underwent an eye procedure prior to his death that raises concerns about the possibility of transmitting the fatal disease to others, United Press International has learned. The development comes on the heels of the announcement Thursday by U.S. Department of Agriculture officials of a possible second case of mad cow disease in U.S. herds.

Richard Da Silva, 58, of Orange County, N.Y., died from Creutzfeldt Jakob disease, an incurable brain-wasting illness that strikes about one person per million.

Richard's wife Ann Marie Da Silva told UPI he underwent a check for the eye disease glaucoma in 2003, approximately a year before his death. The procedure involves the use of a tonometer, which contacts the cornea -- an eye tissue that can contain prions, the infectious agent thought to cause CJD.

Ann Marie's concern is that others who had the tonometer used on them could have gotten infected.

A 2003 study by British researchers suggests her concerns may be justified. A team led by J.W. Ironside from the National Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Surveillance Unit at the University of Edinburgh examined tonometer heads and found they can retain cornea tissue that could infect other people -- even after cleaning and decontaminating the instrument.

"Retained corneal epithelial cells, following the standard decontamination routine of tonometer prisms, may represent potential prion infectivity," the researchers wrote in the British Journal of Ophthalmology last year. "Once the infectious agent is on the cornea, it could theoretically infect the brain."

Prions, misfolded proteins thought to be the cause of mad cow, CJD and similar diseases, are notoriously difficult to destroy and are capable of withstanding most sterilization procedures.

Laura Manuelidis, an expert on these diseases and section chief of surgery in the neuropathology department at Yale University, agreed with the British researchers that tonometers represent a potential risk of passing CJD to other people.

Manuelidis told UPI she has been voicing her concern about the risks of corneas since 1977 when her own study, published in the New England Journal of Medicine, showed the eye tissue, if infected, could transmit CJD.

At the time the procedure was done on Richard Da Silva, about a year before he died, she said it was "absolutely" possible he was infectious.

The CJD Incidents Panel, a body of experts set up by the U.K. Department of Health, noted in a 2001 report that procedures involving the cornea are considered medium risk for transmitting CJD. The first two patients who have a contaminated eye instrument used on them have the highest risk of contracting the disease, the panel said.

In 1999, the U.K. Department of Health banned opticians from reusing equipment that came in contact with patients' eyes out of concern it could result in the transmission of variant CJD, the form of the disease humans can contract from consuming infected beef products.

Richard Da Silva was associated with a cluster of five other cases of CJD in southern New York that raised concerns about vCJD.

None of the cases have been determined to stem from mad cow disease, but concerns about the cattle illness in the United States could increase in light of the USDA announcement Thursday that a cow tested positive on initial tests for the disease. If confirmed, this would be the second U.S. case of the illness; the first was detected in a Washington cow last December. The USDA said the suspect animal disclosed Thursday did not enter the food chain. The USDA did not release further details about the cow, but said results from further lab tests to confirm the initial tests were expected within seven days.

Ann Marie Da Silva said she informed the New York Health Department and later the eye doctor who performed the procedure about her husband's illness and her concerns about the risk of transmitting CJD via the tonometer.

The optometrist -- whom she declined to name because she did not want to jeopardize his career -- "didn't even know what this disease was," she said.

"He said the health department never called him and I called them (the health department) back and they didn't seem concerned about it," she added. "I just kept getting angrier and angrier when I felt I was being dismissed."

She said the state health department "seems to have an attitude of don't ask, don't tell" about CJD.

"There's a stigma attached to it," she said. "Is it because they're so afraid the public will panic? I don't know, but I don't think that the answer is to push things under the rug."

New York State Department of Health spokeswoman Claire Pospisil told UPI she would look into whether the agency was concerned about the possibility of transmitting CJD via tonometers, but she had not called back prior to story publication.

Disposable tonometers are readily available and could avoid the risk of transmitting the disease, Ironside and colleagues noted in their study. Ann Marie Da Silva said she asked the optometrist whether he used disposable tonometers and "he said 'No, it's a reusable one.'"

Ironside's team also noted other ophthalmic instruments come into contact with the cornea and could represent a source of infection as they are either difficult to decontaminate or cannot withstand the harsh procedures necessary to inactivate prions. These include corneal burrs, diagnostic and therapeutic contact lenses and other coated lenses.

Terry Singletary, whose mother died from a type of CJD called Heidenhain Variant, told UPI health officials were not doing enough to prevent people from being infected by contaminated medical equipment.

"They've got to start taking this disease seriously and they simply aren't doing it," said Singletary, who is a member of CJD Watch and CJD Voice -- advocacy groups for CJD patients and their families.

U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention spokeswoman Christine Pearson did not return a phone call from UPI seeking comment. The agency's Web site states the eye is one of three tissues, along with the brain and spinal cord, that are considered to have "high infectivity."

The Web site said more than 250 people worldwide have contracted CJD through contaminated surgical instruments and tissue transplants. This includes as many as four who were infected by corneal grafts. The agency noted no such cases have been reported since 1976, when sterilization procedures were instituted in healthcare facilities.

Ironside and colleagues noted in their study, however, many disinfection procedures used on optical instruments, such as tonometers, fail. They wrote their finding of cornea tissue on tonometers indicates that "no current cleaning and disinfection strategy is fully effective."

Singletary said CDC's assertion that no CJD cases from infected equipment or tissues have been detected since 1976 is misleading.

"They have absolutely no idea" whether any cases have occurred in this manner, he said, because CJD cases often aren't investigated and the agency has not required physicians nationwide report all casesof CJD.

"There's no national surveillance unit for CJD in the United States; people are dying who aren't autopsied, the CDC has no way of knowing" whether people have been infected via infected equipment or tissues, he said.

Ann Marie Da Silva said she has contacted several members of her state's congressional delegation about her concerns, including Rep. Sue Kelly, R-N.Y., and Sen. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y.

"Basically, what I want is to be a positive force in this, but I also want more of a dialogue going on with the public and the health department," she said.

Cadaver corneal transplants -- without family permission Houston, Texas channel 11 news 28 Nov 99 Reported by Terry S. Singeltary Sr.son of CJD victim

Sunday, May 10, 2009

Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Committee On June 12, 2009 (Singeltary submission)


PRODUCT Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced. Recall # B-1148-09 CODE Unit: 3291680 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Florida's Blood Centers, Inc, Orlando, FL, by telephone on January 12, 2009 and by letter dated January 13, 2009. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Blood product, collected from a donor who was at risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), was distributed. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 1 unit DISTRIBUTION FL


PRODUCT 1) Recovered Plasma. Recall # B-1151-09; 2) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced. Recall # B-1152-09 CODE 1) and 2) Unit: 6585642 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Carter BloodCare/ WE & Lela I Stewart Blood Center, Inc, Tyler, TX, by fax on April 23, 2007 and March 11, 2009. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Blood products, collected from a donor considered to be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 2 units DISTRIBUTION TX and Switzerland




PRODUCT 1) Red Blood Cells, Leukocytes Reduced. Recall B-1180-09; 2) Recovered Plasma. Recall # B-1181-09 CODE 1) and 2) Unit: 27LT64128 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER ARC Greater Alleghenies, Johnstown, PA, by telephone or electronic notification on December 1, 2008 and by letter dated December 3, 2008. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Blood products, collected from a donor who may have been at risk for Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD), were distributed. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 2 units DISTRIBUTION CA, WV


PRODUCT 1) Recovered Plasma. Recall # B-1214-09; 2) Red Blood Cells. Recall # B-1215-09 CODE 1) and 2) Unit: KS25920 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Inova Health Care Services, Blood Donor Services, Sterling, VA, by letter dated November 23, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Blood products, collected from a donor considered to be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 2 units DISTRIBUTION VA, NJ


PRODUCT Source Plasma. Recall # B-1206-09 CODE Units: 07YARF0702, 07YARE9866, 07YARE9175, 07YARE8806, 07YARE6013, 07YARE6743, 07YARE7284, 07YARE3054, 07YARE1421, 07YARE1044, 07YARE0168, 07YARD9701, 07YARD8977, 07YARD8152, 07YARD7695, 07YARD6945, 07YARD6722, 07YARD5923, 06YARE3812, 06YARE4248, 06YARE4943, 06YARE5522, 06YARE6898, 06YARE7196, 07YARA0218, 07YARA0575, 07YARA1157, 07YARA1574, 07YARA2145, 07YARA2571, 07YARA5682, 07YARA8317, 07YARA9272, 07YARA9637, 07YARB0583, 07YARB1028, 07YARB1861, 07YARB2231, 07YARB2855, 07YARB3489, 07YARB4656, 07YARB5193, 07YARB5849, 07YARB6358, 07YARB7036, 07YARB7618, 07YARB8311, 07YARB8853, 07YARB9492, 07YARC0024, 07YARC0639, 07YARC1138, 07YARC1799, 07YARC2236, 07YARC3313, 07YARC4218, 07YARC4928, 07YARC5294, 07YARC5924, 07YARC7298, 07YARC8991, 07YARC9252, 07YARD3794, 07YARD4519, 07YARD5590, 07YARF3027 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER BioLife Plasma Services LP, Fayetteville, AR, by fax on January 14, 2008. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Blood products, collected from a donor considered to be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 66 units DISTRIBUTION CA

PRODUCT 1) Red Blood Cells. Recall # B-1250-09; 2) Fresh Frozen Plasma. Recall # B-1251-09 CODE 1) and 2) Unit: 4054709 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Wellmont Health System dba Marsh Regional Blood Center, Kingsport, TN, by letter dated October 4, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Blood products, collected from a donor who was at risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 2 units DISTRIBUTION TN


PRODUCT Source Plasma. Recall # B-1254-09 CODE Units: 363035924, 363035761, 363034642, 363034463, 363034153, 363033965, 363033670, 363033509, 363033093, 363032543, 363032383, 363032099, 363031873, 363031593, 363031321, 363031001, 363030738, 363030235, 363030057, 363029728, 363028978, 363028657, 363028438, 363028031, 363027863, 363027492, 363027314, 363026918, 363026688, 363026356, 363026123, 363025728, 363025483, 363025047, 363024873, 363024318, 363023960, 363023655, 363023279, 363022828, 363022612, 363020673, 363020392, 363021363, 363021144, 363019633, 363019419, 363018827, 363018647, 363016935, 363016561, 363016170, 363015723, 363014906, 363014413, 363014104, 363013235, 363012843, 363012402, 363011999, 363011601, 363011195, 363008854, 363008420, 363008054, 363007611, 363007268, 363006814, 363006486, 363006074, 363005753, 363005310, 363004961, 363004496, 363004188, 363003610, 363000147, I74029391, I74028830, I74028628, I74025361, I74024797, I74024560, I74024220, I74024002, I74023653, I74023404, I74023044, I74022854, I74022445, I74022288, I74021933, I74021763, I74021452, I74021274, I74020724, I74019586, I74025147, 363015212 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Talecris Plasma Resources Inc, Fort Worth, TX, by facsimile on March 13, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Blood products, collected from a donor who was at risk for Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD), were distributed. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 99 units DISTRIBUTION NC




PRODUCT 1) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced. Recall # B-1281-09; 2) Platelets Leukocytes Reduced. Recall # B-1282-09; 3) Recovered Plasma. Recall # B-1283-09 CODE 1) Units: 1974540, W044108025910; 2) Unit: W044108025910; 3) Units: W044108025910, 1974540 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Siouxland Community Blood Bank, Sioux City, IA, by letter and email on February 3, 2009. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Blood products, collected from a donor considered to be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 5 units DISTRIBUTION Austria, IA




Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States 2003 revisited 2009

Saturday, July, 18, 2009


I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena’s. North America seems to have the most species with documented Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy's, most all of which have been rendered and fed back to food producing animals and to humans for years. If you look at the statistics, sporadic CJD seems to be rising in the USA, and has been, with atypical cases of the sCJD. I find deeply disturbing in the year of 2009, that Human Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy of any strain and or phenotype, of all age groups, and I stress all age groups, because human TSE's do not know age, and they do not know borders. someone 56 years old, that has a human TSE, that has surgery, can pass this TSE agent on i.e. friendly fire, and or passing it forward, and there have been documented nvCJD in a 74 year old. Remembering also that only sporadic CJD has been documented to transmit via iatrogenic routes, until recently with the 4 cases of blood related transmission, of which the origin is thought to be nvCJD donors. However most Iatrogenic CJD cases are nothing more than sporadic CJD, until the source is proven, then it becomes Iatrogenic. An oxymoron of sorts, because all sporadic CJD is, are multiple forms, or strains, or phenotypes of Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease, that the route and source and species have not been confirmed and or documented. When will the myth of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory be put to bed for good. This theory in my opinion, and the following there from, as the GOLD STANDARD, has done nothing more than help spread this agent around the globe. Politics and money have caused the terrible consequences to date, and the fact that TSEs are a slow incubating death, but a death that is 100% certain for those that are exposed and live long enough to go clinical. once clinical, there is no recourse, to date. But, while sub-clinical, how many can one exposed human infect? Can humans exposed to CWD and scrapie strains pass it forward as some form of sporadic CJD in the surgical and medical arenas? why must we wait decades and decades to prove this point, only to expose millions needlessly, only for the sake of the industries involved? would it not have been prudent from the beginning to just include all TSE's, and rule them out from there with transmission studies and change policies there from, as opposed to doing just the opposite? The science of TSE's have been nothing more than a political circus since the beginning, and for anyone to still believe in this one strain, one group of bovines, in one geographical location, with only one age group of human TSE i.e. nvCJD myth, for anyone to believe this today only enhances to spreading of these human and animal TSE's. This is exactly why we have been in this quagmire.

The ones that believe that there is a spontaneous CJD in 85%+ of all cases of human TSE, and the ones that do not believe that cattle can have this same phenomenon, are two of the same, the industry, and so goes the political science aspect of this tobacco and or asbestos scenario i.e. follow the money. I could go into all angles of this man made nightmare, the real facts and science, for instance, the continuing rendering technology and slow cooking with low temps that brewed this stew up, and the fact that THE USA HAD THIS TECHNOLOGY FIRST AND SHIPPED IT TO THE U.K. SOME 5 YEARS BEFORE THE U.S. STARTED USING THE SAME TECHNOLOGY, to save on fuel cost. This is what supposedly amplified the TSE agent via sheep scrapie, and spread via feed in the U.K. bovine, and other countries exporting the tainted product. BUT most everyone ignores this fact, and the fact that the U.S. has been recycling more TSE, from more species with TSEs, than any other country documented, but yet, it's all spontaneous, and the rise in sporadic CJD in the U.S. is a happenstance of bad luck ??? I respectfully disagree. To top that all off, the infamous BSE-FIREWALL that the USDA always brags about was nothing more than ink on paper, and I can prove this. YOU can ignore it, but this is FACT (see source, as late as 2007, in one recall alone, some 10,000,000 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED MAD COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE TO BE FED OUT, and most was never recovered. This was banned blood laced, meat and bone meal. 2006 was a banner year for banned mad cow protein going into commerce in the U.S. (see source of FDA feed ban warning letter below). I stress that the August 4, 1997 USA mad cow feed ban and this infamous BSE firewall, was nothing more than ink on paper, it was never enforceable.

I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route. This would further have to be broken down to strain of species and then the route of transmission would further have to be broken down. Accumulation and Transmission are key to the threshold from sub-clinical to clinical disease, and key to all this, is to stop the amplification and transmission of this agent, the spreading of, no matter what strain. In my opinion, to continue with this myth that the U.K. strain of BSE one strain TSE in cows, and the nv/v CJD one strain TSE humans, and the one geographical location source i.e. U.K., and that all the rest of human TSE are just one single strain i.e. sporadic CJD, a happenstance of bad luck that just happens due to a twisted protein that just twisted the wrong way, IN 85%+ OF ALL HUMAN TSEs, when to date there are 6 different phenotypes of sCJD, and growing per Gambetti et al, and that no other animal TSE transmits to humans ??? With all due respect to all Scientist that believe this, I beg to differ. To continue with this masquerade will only continue to spread, expose, and kill, who knows how many more in the years and decades to come. ONE was enough for me, My Mom, hvCJD i.e. Heidenhain Variant CJD, DOD 12/14/97 confirmed, which is nothing more than another mans name added to CJD, like CJD itself, Jakob and Creutzfeldt, or Gerstmann-Straussler-Scheinker syndrome, just another CJD or human TSE, named after another human. WE are only kidding ourselves with the current diagnostic criteria for human and animal TSE, especially differentiating between the nvCJD vs the sporadic CJD strains and then the GSS strains and also the FFI fatal familial insomnia strains or the ones that mimics one or the other of those TSE? Tissue infectivity and strain typing of the many variants of the human and animal TSEs are paramount in all variants of all TSE. There must be a proper classification that will differentiate between all these human TSE in order to do this. With the CDI and other more sensitive testing coming about, I only hope that my proposal will some day be taken seriously. ...

please see history, and the ever evolving TSE science to date ;

Saturday, June 13, 2009

Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States 2003 revisited 2009


Tuesday, July 14, 2009

U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary and BSE Red Book Date: February 14, 2000 at 8:56 am PST

WHERE did we go wrong $$$

Transgenic mice expressing porcine prion protein resistant to classical scrapie but susceptible to sheep bovine spongiform encephalopathy and atypical scrapie. Emerg Infect Dis. 2009 Aug; [Epub ahead of print]

Transmissible mink encephalopathy - review of the etiology

Wednesday, July 1, 2009

Nor98 scrapie identified in the United States J Vet Diagn Invest 21:454-463 (2009)

Monday, June 01, 2009 Biochemical typing of pathological prion protein in aging cattle with BSE


O.K. confusious asks, IF all these new atypical BSEs i.e. new strains of mad cow disease is just an 'OLD COW PRION DISEASE', why then can not the 'old human prion disease' such as the sporadic CJD, be from an 'old cow prion disease', same as the nvCJD 'young people mad cow disease' (which also happens in 74 year old), but why cannot the 'old cow prion diseases', i.e. l-BSE, h-BSE, and ibncBSE, cause the 'old people prion disease', which looks like sporadic CJD. seems that is what some of the pathology is showing ???

OH, that probably makes too much sense, and that the only answer could be that it's all just a happenstance of bad luck and or a spontaneous event, that just happens out of the clear blue sky $$$


Tuesday, August 04, 2009

Susceptibilities of Nonhuman Primates to Chronic Wasting Disease

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

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