Tuesday, March 11, 2014

Science and Technology Committee Oral evidence: Blood, tissue and organ screening, HC 990 Wednesday 5 March 2014 SPORADIC CJD

Science and Technology Committee Oral evidence: Blood, tissue and organ screening, HC 990 Wednesday 5 March 2014 SPORADIC CJD

 

Science and Technology Committee

 

Oral evidence: Blood, tissue and organ screening, HC 990 Wednesday 5 March 2014

 

Ordered by the House of Commons to be published on 5 March 2014.

 

Written evidence from witnesses:

 

– Prometic BioSciences Ltd

 

– Terumo BCT

 

– Prionics AG

 

– DuPont Chemicals and Fluoroproducts

 

Watch the meeting

 

Members present: Andrew Miller (Chair); Jim Dowd; David Heath; Stephen Metcalfe; David Morris; Stephen Mosley; Pamela Nash; Sarah Newton; Graham Stringer; David Tredinnick

 

snip...

 

Professor Collinge: I think there is some misunderstanding there. The apparent incidence of sporadic CJD is increasing. There are about a hundred new cases a year at the moment, and that has gone up substantially from the start of surveillance. That is thought, principally, to reflect better diagnosis of the disease, although that may not be all the explanation. It is possible, and we can talk about that, that some of that may be BSE-related. However, I think that the specific confusion there is that people talk about sporadic CJD occurring at 1 per million. That is not your individual risk. Your risk is 1 per million every year. Actually, it is nearer 2 per million per year of the population will develop sporadic CJD, but your lifetime risk of developing sporadic CJD is about 1 in 30,000. So that has not really changed. When people talk about 1 per million, often they interpret that as thinking it is incredibly rare. They think they have a 1-in-a-million chance of developing this disease. You haven’t. You’ve got about a 1-in-30,000 chance of developing it.

 

snip...

 

Q112 Graham Stringer: Professor Collinge, the last time you were here you said that you believed that the risk of transmission of vCJD via surgical instruments was a significant problem. If that is the case, why have no cases been reported where vCJD has been transmitted in that particular way?

 

Professor Collinge: What I was trying to say is that there is clearly a risk there. We have not been able to quantify that risk. It is correct that we don’t know of any cases of secondary vCJD that can be attributed to surgical instruments at this point in time, but it can’t be excluded that some of the cases we have seen so far of vCJD have been related to that. It is a question of how you would tell. That really comes from epidemiological studies. Since a history of prior surgery—particularly a history of prior dental surgery—is so common, and many patients you see will have had prior surgery and certainly virtually all of them will have had dentistry, it is hard to make that link. The link has been made with sporadic CJD where there have been clearly documented instances of transmission of prions by surgical instruments, by neurosurgical instruments. There is also epidemiological evidence from several countries now that patients developing classical CJD are more likely to have had abdominal surgery beforehand, for example. There are sufficient numbers where an epidemiological link has been shown. You are right—we don’t have definite evidence that a surgically transmitted case of vCJD has occurred, but that is, perhaps, not surprising at this point in time.

 

What we do have is a great deal of scientific evidence that, first of all, the infective agent in vCJD is much more widely distributed in the body than it is in classical CJD, so there is more opportunity for it to contact surgical and medical instruments. Of course, as you heard from the HPA study, there are, potentially, quite a lot of people carrying the infection around. We also know, experimentally, that it is relatively easy to transmit prions by binding them to metal surfaces. In fact, it is something that we use experimentally now. It is a very efficient way of transmitting the disease. Indeed, the blood test that we talked about earlier exploits the affinity of prions on metal surfaces as a way of concentrating the infective agent prior to detection. There is plenty of scientific evidence that this would be an efficient route of transmission. There is plenty of evidence that there are many people in the UK incubating the disease and that the infection would be in tissues that come into contact with surgical instruments. But you are right: so far, there is not a documented example of that happening with vCJD.

 


 

Wednesday, December 11, 2013

 

*** Detection of Infectivity in Blood of Persons with Variant and Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease ***

 


 

Sunday, March 09, 2014

 

*** A Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) Lookback Study: Assessing the Risk of Blood Borne Transmission of Classic Forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

 

FDA TSEAC CIRCUS AND TRAVELING ROAD SHOW FOR THE TSE PRION DISEASES

 


 

Thursday, January 2, 2014

 

*** CWD TSE Prion in cervids to hTGmice, Heidenhain Variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease MM1 genotype, and iatrogenic CJD ??? ***

 


 

Thursday, February 20, 2014

 

*** Unnecessary precautions BSE MAD COW DISEASE Dr. William James FSIS VS Dr. Linda Detwiler 2014

 


 

 Saturday, February 01, 2014

 

*** vCJD With Extremely Low Lymphoreticular Deposition of Prion Protein MAY NOT HAVE BEEN DETECTABLE

 


 

Monday, October 14, 2013

 

*** Researchers estimate one in 2,000 people in the UK carry variant CJD proteins ***

 


 

Wednesday, December 11, 2013

 

*** Detection of Infectivity in Blood of Persons with Variant and Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease ***

 


 

Thursday, March 6, 2014

 

*** TEXAS RECALL LIST MASSIVE FROM DEAD STOCK DOWNER CANCER COWS OFFAL from Class I Recall 002-2014 and 013-2014 Health Risk: High Jan 13, 2014 and Feb 8, 2014 shipped to Texas, Florida, and Illinois UPDATE FEBRUARY 14, 2014 ***

 


 

WHAT about the sporadic CJD TSE proteins ?

 

WE now know that some cases of sporadic CJD are linked to atypical BSE and atypical Scrapie, so why are not MORE concerned about the sporadic CJD, and all it’s sub-types $$$

 

Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease CJD cases rising North America updated report August 2013

 

*** Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease CJD cases rising North America with Canada seeing an extreme increase of 48% between 2008 and 2010 ***

 


 

Sunday, October 13, 2013

 

*** CJD TSE Prion Disease Cases in Texas by Year, 2003-2012

 


 

Friday, January 10, 2014

 

vpspr, sgss, sffi, TSE, an iatrogenic by-product of gss, ffi, familial type prion disease, what it ???

 


 

Monday, October 10, 2011

 

EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story

 

snip...

 

EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far *** but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded. Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.

 

snip...

 


 


 

Thursday, August 12, 2010 Seven main threats for the future linked to prions First threat The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed.

 

***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.

 

Second threat

 

snip...

 


 

*** The potential impact of prion diseases on human health was greatly magnified by the recognition that interspecies transfer of BSE to humans by beef ingestion resulted in vCJD. While changes in animal feed constituents and slaughter practices appear to have curtailed vCJD, there is concern that CWD of free-ranging deer and elk in the U.S. might also cross the species barrier. Thus, consuming venison could be a source of human prion disease. Whether BSE and CWD represent interspecies scrapie transfer or are newly arisen prion diseases is unknown. Therefore, the possibility of transmission of prion disease through other food animals cannot be ruled out. There is evidence that vCJD can be transmitted through blood transfusion. There is likely a pool of unknown size of asymptomatic individuals infected with vCJD, and there may be asymptomatic individuals infected with the CWD equivalent. These circumstances represent a potential threat to blood, blood products, and plasma supplies.

 


 

Monday, March 10, 2014

 

Docket No. 00-108-10 Chronic Wasting Disease Herd Certification Program and Interstate Movement of Farmed or Captive Deer, Elk, and Moose; Program Standards

 

Singeltary Submission

 


 

BSE prions propagate as either variant CJD-like or sporadic CJD-like prion strains in transgenic mice expressing human prion protein

 

Variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease (vCJD) has been recognized to date only in individuals homozygous for methionine at PRNP codon 129. Here we show that transgenic mice expressing human PrP methionine 129, inoculated with either bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) or variant CJD prions, may develop the neuropathological and molecular phenotype of vCJD, consistent with these diseases being caused by the same prion strain. Surprisingly, however, BSE transmission to these transgenic mice, in addition to producing a vCJD-like phenotype, can also result in a distinct molecular phenotype that is indistinguishable from that of sporadic CJD with PrPSc type 2. These data suggest that more than one BSE-derived prion strain might infect humans; it is therefore possible that some patients with a phenotype consistent with sporadic CJD may have a disease arising from BSE exposure.

 


 

Wednesday, December 4, 2013

 

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products; Final Rule Federal Register / Vol. 78 , No. 233 / Wednesday, December 4, 2013

 

TO ALL IMPORTING COUNTRIES THAT IMPORTS FROM THE USA, BE WARNED, NEW MAD COW BSE REGULATIONS USDA, AND OIE, not worth the paper the regulations were wrote on, kind of like the mad cow feed ban of August 1997, nothing but ink on paper $$$

 

full text ;

 


 

Monday, December 02, 2013

 

*** A parliamentary inquiry has been launched today into the safety of blood, tissue and organ screening following fears that vCJD – the human form of ‘mad cow’ disease – may be being spread by medical procedures

 


 

U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001

 


 


 

Aug. 5, 2001, 12:25AM

 

Mad cow disease: Could it be here?

 

Man's stubborn crusade attracts experts' notice

 

By CAROL CHRISTIAN Copyright 2001 Houston Chronicle

 

Like Paul Revere with e-mail, Terry Singeltary Sr. is on a mission to sound an alarm: Beware of mad cow disease.

 

As is true of many crusaders, however, his pleas often fall on deaf ears. Health officials here and abroad insist that bovine spongiform encephalopathy -- popularly known as mad cow disease, a fatal brain disorder that can make cows shake uncontrollably -- has been kept out of this country through surveillance of the cattle industry.

 

But since his mother's death in December 1997, the Galveston County man has been obsessed with possible connections between her deadly brain disorder, sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, and mad cow disease.

 

And after much persistence on his part, people are taking notice of this former machinist and high school dropout who jokes that he has a Ph.D. -- a Pool Hall Degree.

 

"They called me Chicken Little for four years," he said. "Now they're calling back, asking for more information."

 

For the past year he has been U.S. co-coordinator of an international monitoring group called CJD Watch. He regularly gets e-mail from scientists and journalists around the world.

 

Debora MacKenzie, a reporter for the British magazine New Scientist, described Singeltary, 47, as a "dogged unearther and tabulator of government documents." Singeltary monitors "every word written about CJD/BSE," said Anita Manning of USA Today, also by e-mail.

 

"He's passionate, opinionated and not always tactful, although I like him because he's such a character and he is so transparent," Manning said. "He is what he appears to be."

 

Science and environment writer Jonathan Leake of the Sunday Times in London said Singeltary has helped him track down families of people with CJD along with academic research papers.

 

"I strongly suspect he is right in thinking the USA has had BSE cases," Leake said by e-mail.

 

"The American government is making the same mistake as the British in putting the short-term commercial interests of its farmers before health considerations," he added.

 

"It should start formal and widespread testing of cattle plus compulsory autopsies for all human CJD victims at the state's expense. If there is BSE, then leaving it to spread will kill people -- and that would eventually destroy the industry, too."

 

Texas Department of Health epidemiologist Julie Rawlings said Singeltary's careful monitoring of the disease had proven useful.

 

"Terry has been helpful in providing contact information regarding suspect CJD cases so that the Health Department can initiate case investigations and learn more about CJD in Texas," she said.

 

Noting that the department cannot release records on individual patients, she added, "I think we learn more from him than he does from us."

 

Mad cow disease surfaced in England in 1986 and quickly became an epidemic. It since has been reported in 15 European countries, most recently Greece on July 2, and the Czech Republic on June 14. Two German-born cows tested positive for BSE in November.

 

Singeltary said he became convinced that BSE is here as he watched his mother, Barbara Poulter of Crystal Beach, dying of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease. The rare, fatal brain disease is sometimes accompanied by severe jerking.

 

"She would jerk so bad at times, it would take three of us to hold her down," Singeltary said. "They can call it whatever they want, but I know what I saw, and what she went through. `Sporadic' simply means they don't know."

 

Poulter, a retired telephone-company field worker, had a form of sporadic CJD -- Haidenhain variant -- that is even less common than the typical sporadic case. One of its first symptoms is loss of vision.

 

She started seeing brown spots in September 1997 and was virtually blind within two weeks. By the eighth week of the illness Poulter was bedridden, and in the 10th week she died. Before that she had been in good health.

 

In many countries and most U.S. states, physicians are not required to report CJD cases to health officials. Texas made the disease reportable in 1998. Through 2000, there were 17 probable or confirmed cases, according to the Texas Department of Health.

 

In mid-June, a case of sporadic CJD was confirmed through brain biopsy at Christus Spohn Hospital Shoreline in Corpus Christi, said Jane Bakos, hospital vice president. The patient has since died, the hospital reported.

 

CJD and mad cow disease leave their victims' brains full of holes like a sponge.

 

Although not contagious, the illnesses are thought to be transmissible through prions, or nearly indestructible abnormal proteins.

 

Because the prion protein is not killed by standard sterilization, sporadic CJD can be spread by contaminated surgical instruments.

 

In March 1996, the British government announced the discovery of a new variant of CJD, most likely explained by exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy.

 

Through June, 101 cases of new-variant CJD have been reported in the United Kingdom, three in France and one in Ireland. In contrast to sporadic CJD, the new variant usually affects younger patients and lasts longer.

 

No cases of new-variant CJD or BSE have been reported in the United States. No relationship has been shown between sporadic CJD and mad cow disease.

 

There is no indication that new-variant CJD can be spread through blood transfusions, but a U.S. Food and Drug Administration advisory committee voted in June to broaden the categories for excluding potential donors. The recommendations have not yet been approved by the FDA.

 

The American Red Cross has announced that on Sept. 17 it will begin rejecting potential blood donors who, since 1980, have spent at least three months in the United Kingdom or at least six months in any European country or combination of countries. Those who have received a blood transfusion in Britain since 1980 also will be rejected.

 

The primary collector of local blood donations is the Gulf Coast Regional Blood Center, which will follow the FDA's guidelines, said Bill Teague, president and chief executive officer.

 

Singeltary said it's naive to think that U.S. prevention efforts have kept mad cow and new-variant CJD out of the United States.

 

"They haven't found it," he said, "because they haven't looked."

 

For one thing, he said, too few cows are tested for the disease. In the first six months of this year, the European Union tested more than 3.2 million cows, David Byrne of the European Commission said in a speech last month.

 

By contrast, it took the U.S. Department of Agriculture nearly 10 years to analyze about 13,000 cow brains, according to the department's Web site.

 

With more than 68 million cattle slaughtered since 1990 in the United States, according to the USDA, checking about 13,000 falls far short, Singeltary said.

 

Though not a scholar, Singeltary has collected voluminous material on mad cow and CJD. Disabled from a neck injury, Singeltary never used a computer until 1998.

 

He now spends hours each day on the Internet while his wife, Bonnie Singeltary, runs a flower shop in their home in Bacliff, in north Galveston County.

 

His challenge to the CJD/BSE establishment is courageous and refreshing, said Dr. Lynette Dumble, former visiting professor of surgery at University of Texas Medical School at Houston and a former senior research fellow in the history and philosophy of science at the University of Melbourne in Australia.

 

"I certainly have no problem with Terry's ideas on BSE/CJD," said Dumble, who coordinates the Global Sisterhood Network, a computer service that posts media reports on developments affecting women. "His research skills are excellent, and he is abreast of each and every development in the field."

 

Among Singeltary's worries now, he said, are widespread violations of an August 1997 ban on feeding animal products to U.S. cattle. The FDA reported in January that hundreds of feed manufacturers were not complying with regulations designed to keep BSE out of this country.

 

(That same month, a Purina Mills feedlot near San Antonio told the FDA that a "very low level" of cow parts had been found in cattle feed. The company voluntarily removed 1,222 animals who had been fed the prohibited materials.)

 

He obtained copies of FDA letters to various feed mills that had been found in violation of the regulations and immediately sent them by e-mail to hundreds of people around the world.

 

Singeltary might not be so zealous in getting the word out if he weren't convinced that someone is covering up the truth.

 

"They used to say BSE would never transmit to humans," he said, "and it has. They lied about the feed ban being in place.

 

"I've lost faith in the whole process. I've discovered too many things."

 


 

Sporadic CJD type 1 and atypical/ Nor98 scrapie are characterized by fine (reticular) deposits,

 

see also ;

 

All of the Heidenhain variants were of the methionine/ methionine type 1 molecular subtype.

 


 

also, see relations from atypical h-type BSE and Heidenhain Variant of Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease here ;

 

Wednesday, February 26, 2014

 

GERMANY REPORTS ANOTHER CASE OF ATYPICAL BSE (H-TYPE)

 


 

Tuesday, July 29, 2008

 

Heidenhain Variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease Case Report

 

snip...

 

Heidenhain Variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease autopsy case report 'MOM'

 

DIVISION OF NEUROPATHOLOGY University of Texas Medical Branch 114 McCullough Bldg. Galveston, Texas 77555-0785

 

FAX COVER SHEET

 

DATE: 4-23-98

 

TO: Mr. Terry Singeltary @ -------

 

FROM: Gerald Campbell

 

FAX: (409) 772-5315 PHONE: (409) 772-2881

 

Number of Pages (including cover sheet):

 

Message:

 

*CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE*

 

This document accompanying this transmission contains confidential information belonging to the sender that is legally privileged. This information is intended only for the use of the individual or entry names above. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying distribution, or the taking of any action in reliances on the contents of this telefaxed information is strictly prohibited. If you received this telefax in error, please notify us by telephone immediately to arrange for return of the original documents. -------------------------- Patient Account: 90000014-518 Med. Rec. No.: (0160)118511Q Patient Name: POULTER, BARBARA Age: 63 YRS DOB: 10/17/34 Sex: F Admitting Race: C

 

Attending Dr.: Date / Time Admitted : 12/14/97 1228 Copies to:

 

UTMB University of Texas Medical Branch Galveston, Texas 77555-0543 (409) 772-1238 Fax (409) 772-5683 Pathology Report

 

FINAL AUTOPSY DIAGNOSIS Autopsy' Office (409)772-2858

 

Autopsy NO.: AU-97-00435

 

AUTOPSY INFORMATION: Occupation: Unknown Birthplace: Unknown Residence: Crystal Beach Date/Time of Death: 12/14/97 13:30 Date/Time of Autopsy: 12/15/97 15:00 Pathologist/Resident: Pencil/Fernandez Service: Private Restriction: Brain only

 

FINAL AUTOPSY DIAGNOSIS

 

I. Brain: Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, Heidenhain variant.

 

snip...see full text ;

 


 

P.5.21

 

*** Parallels between different forms of sheep scrapie and types of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD)

 

Wiebke M. Wemheuer1, Sylvie L. Benestad2, Arne Wrede1, Wilhelm E. Wemheuer3, Tatjana Pfander1, Bjørn Bratberg2, Bertram Brenig3,Walter J. Schulz-Schaeffer1 1University Medical Center Goettingen, Germany; 2Institute of Veterinary Medicine Oslo, Norway; 3Institute of Veterinary Medicine Goettingen, Germany

 

Background: Scrapie in sheep and goats is often regarded as the archetype of prion diseases. In 1998, a new form of scrapie - atypical/Nor98 scrapie - was described that differed from classical scrapie in terms of epidemiology, Western blot profile, the distribution of pathological prion protein (PrPSc) in the body and its stability against proteinase K. In a similar way, distinct disease types exist in sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD). They differ with regard to their clinical outcome, Western blot profile and PrPSc deposition pattern in the central nervous system (CNS).

 

Objectives: The comparison of PrPSc deposits in sheep scrapie and human sporadic CJD.

 

Methods: Tissues of the CNS of sheep with classical scrapie, sheep with atypical/Nor98 scrapie and 20 patients with sporadic CJD were examined using the sensitive Paraffin Embedded Tissue (PET) blot method. The results were compared with those obtained by immunohistochemistry. With the objective of gaining information on the protein conformation, the PrPSc of classical and atypical/Nor98 sheep scrapie and sporadic CJD was tested for its stability against denaturation with guanidine hydrochloride (GdnHCl) using a Membrane Adsorption Assay.

 

Results: The PrPSc of atypical/Nor98 scrapie cases and of CJD prion type 1 patients exhibits a mainly reticular/synaptic deposition pattern in the brain and is relatively sensitive to denaturation with GdnHCl. In contrast classical scrapie cases and CJD prion type 2 patients have a more complex PrPSc deposition pattern in common that consists of larger PrPSc aggregates and the PrPSc itself is comparatively stable against denaturation.

 

Discussion: The similarity between CJD types and scrapie types indicates that at least two comparable forms of the misfolded prion protein exist beyond species barriers and can elicit prion diseases. It seems therefore reasonable to classify classical and atypical/Nor98 scrapie - in analogy to the existing CJD types - as different scrapie types.

 


 

Monday, November 30, 2009

 

USDA AND OIE COLLABORATE TO EXCLUDE ATYPICAL SCRAPIE NOR-98 ANIMAL HEALTH CODE

 


 

Monday, December 1, 2008

 

When Atypical Scrapie cross species barriers

 


 

why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $

 

 snip...

 

5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough. Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might be best to retain that hypothesis.

 

snip...

 

R. BRADLEY

 


 

1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8

 

Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to nonhuman primates.

 

Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC.

 

Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of sheep and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were exposed to the infectious agents only by their nonforced consumption of known infectious tissues. The asymptomatic incubation period in the one monkey exposed to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25 and 32 months, respectively. Careful physical examination of the buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed to reveal signs or oral lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru has remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under observation.

 

snip...

 

The successful transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie by natural feeding to squirrel monkeys that we have reported provides further grounds for concern that scrapie-infected meat may occasionally give rise in humans to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.

 

PMID: 6997404

 


 

 Recently the question has again been brought up as to whether scrapie is transmissible to man. This has followed reports that the disease has been transmitted to primates. One particularly lurid speculation (Gajdusek 1977) conjectures that the agents of scrapie, kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and transmissible encephalopathy of mink are varieties of a single "virus". The U.S. Department of Agriculture concluded that it could "no longer justify or permit scrapie-blood line and scrapie-exposed sheep and goats to be processed for human or animal food at slaughter or rendering plants" (ARC 84/77)" The problem is emphasised by the finding that some strains of scrapie produce lesions identical to the once which characterise the human dementias"

 

Whether true or not. the hypothesis that these agents might be transmissible to man raises two considerations. First, the safety of laboratory personnel requires prompt attention. Second, action such as the "scorched meat" policy of USDA makes the solution of the acrapie problem urgent if the sheep industry is not to suffer grievously.

 

snip...

 

76/10.12/4.6

 


 

 Nature. 1972 Mar 10;236(5341):73-4.

 

Transmission of scrapie to the cynomolgus monkey (Macaca fascicularis). Gibbs CJ Jr, Gajdusek DC.

 

Nature 236, 73 - 74 (10 March 1972); doi:10.1038/236073a0

 

Transmission of Scrapie to the Cynomolgus Monkey (Macaca fascicularis)

 

C. J. GIBBS jun. & D. C. GAJDUSEK

 

National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland

 

SCRAPIE has been transmitted to the cynomolgus, or crab-eating, monkey (Macaca fascicularis) with an incubation period of more than 5 yr from the time of intracerebral inoculation of scrapie-infected mouse brain. The animal developed a chronic central nervous system degeneration, with ataxia, tremor and myoclonus with associated severe scrapie-like pathology of intensive astroglial hypertrophy and proliferation, neuronal vacuolation and status spongiosus of grey matter. The strain of scrapie virus used was the eighth passage in Swiss mice (NIH) of a Compton strain of scrapie obtained as ninth intracerebral passage of the agent in goat brain, from Dr R. L. Chandler (ARC, Compton, Berkshire).

 


 


 

 

 

Re: vCJD in the USA * BSE in U.S. 15 November 1999 Terry S Singeltary, NA

 

CWD is just a small piece of a very big puzzle. I have seen while deer hunting, deer, squirrels and birds, eating from cattle feed troughs where they feed cattle, the high protein cattle by products, at least up until Aug. 4, 1997. So why would it be so hard to believe that this is how they might become infected with a TSE. Or, even by potentially infected land. It's been well documented that it could be possible, from scrapie.

 

It was proven in Oprah Winfrey's trial, that Cactus Cattle feeders, sent neurologically ill cattle, some with encephalopathy stamped on the dead slips, were picked up and sent to the renders, along with sheep carcasses.

 


 

U.S. Scientist should be concerned with a CJD epidemic in the U.S., as well...

 

2 January 2000 Terry S Singeltary

 

The exact same recipe for B.S.E. existed in the U.S. for years and years. In reading over the Qualitative Analysis of BSE Risk Factors-1, this is a 25 page report by the USDA:APHIS:VS. It could have been done in one page. The first page, fourth paragraph says it all;

 

"Similarities exist in the two countries usage of continuous rendering technology and the lack of usage of solvents, however, large differences still remain with other risk factors which greatly reduce the potential risk at the national level."

 

Then, the next 24 pages tries to down-play the high risks of B.S.E. in the U.S., with nothing more than the cattle to sheep ratio count, and the geographical locations of herds and flocks. That's all the evidence they can come up with, in the next 24 pages.

 

Something else I find odd, page 16;

 

"In the United Kingdom there is much concern for a specific continuous rendering technology which uses lower temperatures and accounts for 25 percent of total output. This technology was _originally_ designed and imported from the United States. However, the specific application in the production process is _believed_ to be different in the two countries."

 

A few more factors to consider, page 15;

 

"Figure 26 compares animal protein production for the two countries. The calculations are based on slaughter numbers, fallen stock estimates, and product yield coefficients. This approach is used due to variation of up to 80 percent from different reported sources. At 3.6 million tons, the United States produces 8 times more animal rendered product than the United Kingdom."

 

"The risk of introducing the BSE agent through sheep meat and bone meal is more acute in both relative and absolute terms in the United Kingdom (Figures 27 and 28). Note that sheep meat and bone meal accounts for 14 percent, or 61 thousand tons, in the United Kingdom versus 0.6 percent or 22 thousand tons in the United States. For sheep greater than 1 year, this is less than one-tenth of one percent of the United States supply."

 

"The potential risk of amplification of the BSE agent through cattle meat and bone meal is much greater in the United States where it accounts for 59 percent of total product or almost 5 times more than the total amount of rendered product in the United Kingdom."

 

Considering, it would only take _one_ scrapie infected sheep to contaminate the feed. Considering Scrapie has run rampant in the U.S. for years, as of Aug. 1999, 950 scrapie infected flocks. Also, Considering only one quarter spoonful of scrapie infected material is lethal to a cow. Considering all this, the sheep to cow ration is meaningless. As I said, it's 24 pages of B.S.e.

 

To be continued...

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA

 

Competing interests: None declared

 


 

Letters

 

JAMA. 2001;285(6):733-734. doi: 10.1001/jama.285.6.733

 

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

 

Terry S. Singeltary, Sr Bacliff, Tex

 

Since this article does not have an abstract, we have provided the first 150 words of the full text.

 

KEYWORDS: creutzfeldt-jakob disease, diagnosis. To the Editor: In their Research Letter, Dr Gibbons and colleagues1 reported that the annual US death rate due to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) has been stable since 1985. These estimates, however, are based only on reported cases, and do not include misdiagnosed or preclinical cases. It seems to me that misdiagnosis alone would drastically change these figures. An unknown number of persons with a diagnosis of Alzheimer disease in fact may have CJD, although only a small number of these patients receive the postmortem examination necessary to make this diagnosis. Furthermore, only a few states have made CJD reportable. Human and animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathies should be reportable nationwide and internationally.

 

References 1. Gibbons RV, Holman RC, Belay ED, Schonberger LB. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States: 1979-1998. JAMA. 2000;284:2322-2323.

 


 

Published March 26, 2003

 

RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States

 

Terry S. Singeltary, retired (medically)

 

I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to comment on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging forms of CJD. Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. However, CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be made reportable in every state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs in the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey by intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly expose others. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?

 

Published March 26, 2003

 


 

14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure - Final Abstract Number: ISE.114

 

Session: International Scientific Exchange

 

Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009

 

T. Singeltary Bacliff, TX, USA

 

Background: An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.

 

Methods: 12 years independent research of available data

 

Results: I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.

 

Conclusion: I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.

 


 

The Lancet Infectious Diseases, Volume 3, Issue 8, Page 463, August 2003 doi:10.1016/S1473-3099(03)00715-1Cite or Link Using DOI

 

Tracking spongiform encephalopathies in North America

 

Original

 

Xavier Bosch

 

“My name is Terry S Singeltary Sr, and I live in Bacliff, Texas. I lost my mom to hvCJD (Heidenhain variant CJD) and have been searching for answers ever since. What I have found is that we have not been told the truth. CWD in deer and elk is a small portion of a much bigger problem.” 49-year—old Singeltary is one of a number of people who have remained largely unsatisfied after being told that a close relative died from a rapidly progressive dementia compatible with spontaneous Creutzfeldt—Jakob ...

 


 


 

SEE FULL TEXT ;

 

-------- Original Message --------

 

Subject: Tracking spongiform encephalopathies in North America LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASE Volume 3, Number 8 01 August 2003

 

Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2003 17:35:30 –0500

 

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

 

To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de

 

Volume 3, Number 8 01 August 2003

 

Previous

 

Next

 

Newsdesk

 

Tracking spongiform encephalopathies in North America

 

Xavier Bosch

 

My name is Terry S Singeltary Sr, and I live in Bacliff, Texas. I lost my mom to hvCJD (Heidenhain variant CJD) and have been searching for answers ever since. What I have found is that we have not been told the truth. CWD in deer and elk is a small portion of a much bigger problem.

 

49-year-old Singeltary is one of a number of people who have remained largely unsatisfied after being told that a close relative died from a rapidly progressive dementia compatible with spontaneous Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD). So he decided to gather hundreds of documents on transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) and realised that if Britons could get variant CJD from bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), Americans might get a similar disorder from chronic wasting disease (CWD)the relative of mad cow disease seen among deer and elk in the USA. Although his feverish search did not lead him to the smoking gun linking CWD to a similar disease in North American people, it did uncover a largely disappointing situation.

 

Singeltary was greatly demoralised at the few attempts to monitor the occurrence of CJD and CWD in the USA. Only a few states have made CJD reportable. Human and animal TSEs should be reportable nationwide and internationally, he complained in a letter to the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA 2003; 285: 733). I hope that the CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85% plus of all CJD cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route or source.

 

Until recently, CWD was thought to be confined to the wild in a small region in Colorado. But since early 2002, it has been reported in other areas, including Wisconsin, South Dakota, and the Canadian province of Saskatchewan. Indeed, the occurrence of CWD in states that were not endemic previously increased concern about a widespread outbreak and possible transmission to people and cattle.

 

To date, experimental studies have proven that the CWD agent can be transmitted to cattle by intracerebral inoculation and that it can cross the mucous membranes of the digestive tract to initiate infection in lymphoid tissue before invasion of the central nervous system. Yet the plausibility of CWD spreading to people has remained elusive.

 

Part of the problem seems to stem from the US surveillance system. CJD is only reported in those areas known to be endemic foci of CWD. Moreover, US authorities have been criticised for not having performed enough prionic tests in farm deer and elk.

 

Although in November last year the US Food and Drug Administration issued a directive to state public-health and agriculture officials prohibiting material from CWD-positive animals from being used as an ingredient in feed for any animal species, epidemiological control and research in the USA has been quite different from the situation in the UK and Europe regarding BSE.

 

Getting data on TSEs in the USA from the government is like pulling teeth, Singeltary argues. You get it when they want you to have it, and only what they want you to have.

 

Norman Foster, director of the Cognitive Disorders Clinic at the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor, MI, USA), says that current surveillance of prion disease in people in the USA is inadequate to detect whether CWD is occurring in human beings; adding that, the cases that we know about are reassuring, because they do not suggest the appearance of a new variant of CJD in the USA or atypical features in patients that might be exposed to CWD. However, until we establish a system that identifies and analyses a high proportion of suspected prion disease cases we will not know for sure. The USA should develop a system modelled on that established in the UK, he points out.

 

Ali Samii, a neurologist at Seattle VA Medical Center who recently reported the cases of three hunterstwo of whom were friendswho died from pathologically confirmed CJD, says that at present there are insufficient data to claim transmission of CWD into humans; adding that [only] by asking [the questions of venison consumption and deer/elk hunting] in every case can we collect suspect cases and look into the plausibility of transmission further. Samii argues that by making both doctors and hunters more aware of the possibility of prions spreading through eating venison, doctors treating hunters with dementia can consider a possible prion disease, and doctors treating CJD patients will know to ask whether they ate venison.

 

CDC spokesman Ermias Belay says that the CDC will not be investigating the [Samii] cases because there is no evidence that the men ate CWD-infected meat. He notes that although the likelihood of CWD jumping the species barrier to infect humans cannot be ruled out 100% and that [we] cannot be 100% sure that CWD does not exist in humans& the data seeking evidence of CWD transmission to humans have been very limited.

 


 

LANCET SINGELTARY ET AL CWD TSE PRION NORTH AMERICA

 


 

Singeltary submission to PLOS ;

 

No competing interests declared.

 

see full text ;

 


 

Owens, Julie

 

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]

 

Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM

 

To: FSIS RegulationsComments

 

Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Page 1 of 98

 


 

FSIS, USDA, REPLY TO SINGELTARY

 


 

Sunday, August 09, 2009

 

CJD...Straight talk with...James Ironside...and...Terry Singeltary... 2009

 


 

Tuesday, August 18, 2009

 

* BSE-The Untold Story - joe gibbs and singeltary 1999 - 2009

 


 

 Monday, March 10, 2014

 

Investigators study silent variant of mad cow disease Galveston Daily News March 4, 2014

 


 

 Wednesday, May 16, 2012

 

*** Alzheimer’s disease and Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy prion disease, Iatrogenic, what if ?

 

Proposal ID: 29403

 


 

CJD QUESTIONNAIRE USA

 


 


 

CJD VOICE

 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 

 

Thank You,

 

Respectfully,

 

I am sincerely,

 

layperson

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 flounder9@verizon.net

 

MOM DOD 12/14/97 confirm ‘hvCJD’ just made a promise to mom, NEVER FORGET! and never let them forget. ...

Sunday, March 09, 2014

A Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) Lookback Study: Assessing the Risk of Blood Borne Transmission of Classic Forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

A Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) Lookback Study: Assessing the Risk of Blood Borne Transmission of Classic Forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

 

The summary for the A Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) Lookback Study: Assessing the Risk of Blood Borne Transmission of Classic Forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Federal Grant is detailed below.

 

This summary states who is eligible for the grant, how much grant money will be awarded, current and past deadlines, Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA) numbers, and a sampling of similar government grants. Verify the accuracy of the data FederalGrants.com provides by visiting the webpage noted in the Link to Full Announcement section or by contacting the appropriate person listed as the Grant Announcement Contact. If any section is incomplete, please visit the website for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which is the government agency that is offering this grant. Federal Grant Title: A Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) Lookback Study: Assessing the Risk of Blood Borne Transmission of Classic Forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Federal Agency Name: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Grant Categories: Health Type of Opportunity: Discretionary Funding Opportunity Number: RFA-CK-14-005 Type of Funding: Cooperative Agreement CFDA Numbers: 93.084 CFDA Descriptions: Prevention of Disease, Disability, and Death by Infectious Diseases Current Application Deadline: Feb 25, 2014 Application Due Date: February 25, 2014, by 5:00 PM U.S. Eastern Time. Letter of Intent: Not Applicable Original Application Deadline: Feb 25, 2014 Application Due Date: February 25, 2014, by 5:00 PM U.S. Eastern Time. Letter of Intent: Not Applicable Posted Date: Jan 17, 2014 Creation Date: Jan 17, 2014 Archive Date: Mar 27, 2014 Total Program Funding: $380000 Maximum Federal Grant Award: $76000 Minimum Federal Grant Award: $70000 Expected Number of Awards: 1 Cost Sharing or Matching: No

 

Grant Description The purpose of this funding opportunity announcement (FOA) is for the American Red Cross (ARC) to continue an active, nationwide study that began in 1995 of recipients of blood products from CJD donors to assess the risk of blood borne transmission of CJD in the United Stated. Applicants Eligible for this Grant Others (see text field entitled "Additional Information on Eligibility" for clarification) Additional Information on Eligibility Eligible Organizations: The American Red Cross Grant Announcement Contact CDC Procurement and Grants Office (PGO) Technical Information Management Section (TIMS) Phone: 770-488-2700 TECHNICAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SECTION (TIMS)

 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 404-498-2015

 


 

Wednesday, December 11, 2013

 

*** Detection of Infectivity in Blood of Persons with Variant and Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease ***

 


 

CJD LOOKBACK STUDY

 


 


 


 


 

TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING

 

Thursday, June 2, 1999 CHAIRMAN BROWN:

 

My name is Dr. Paul Brown. Welcome to the FDA traveling road show. We are asked yet once more by the FDA to consider a question of theoretical risk in the absence of sufficient knowledge on which to base any firm conclusion. The issue before us today is that of excluding categories of American blood donors who have either visited or resided for longer periods of time in Great Britain. The issue is sufficiently delicate, as you see that we have been moved outside the Beltway. (Laughter.)snip... "Dr. Alan Williams is employed by the American Red Cross, Holland Labs,and is Scientific Adviser for the Florida Blood Services and Canadian Blood Services. In addition, he has financial interests in firms that could be affected by the general discussions. "Dr. Richard Race has financial interests in firms that could be affected by the general discussions and is a public health science researcher. "In the event that the discussions involve specific products or specific firms for which FDA participants have a financial interest, the participants are aware of the need to exclude themselves from such involvement. And their exclusion will be noted for the public record. A copy of the waivers is available by written request under the Freedom of Information Act. "With respect to all other meeting participants, we ask in the interest of fairness that they address any current or previous financial involvement with any firm whose product they may wish to comment upon." So ends the reading of the conflict of interest statement. Dr. Brown, I turn the meeting over to you.

 

snip...

 


 

Sunday, June 3, 2012

 

A new neurological disease in primates inoculated with prion-infected blood or blood components

 


 

Friday, June 29, 2012

 

Highly Efficient Prion Transmission by Blood Transfusion

 


 

price of prion poker goes up again

 

$$$ Monday, June 11, 2012

 

Guidance for Industry Draft Guidance for Industry: Amendment to “Guidance for Industry: Revised Preventive Measures to Reduce the Possible Risk of Transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease and Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease by Blood and Blood Products”

 


 

Thursday, August 16, 2012

 

Blood products, collected from a donor who was at risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease ( vCJD) USA JUNE, JULY, AUGUST 2012

 


 

Saturday, August 18, 2012

 

RedCross Request Jerome H. Holland Laboratory is collecting small volumes of blood from patients afflicted with various forms of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE)/prion diseases and their blood-related family members 2012

 


 


 

 Friday, August 16, 2013

 

*** Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) biannual update August 2013 U.K. and Contaminated blood products induce a highly atypical prion disease devoid of PrPres in primates

 


 

Wednesday, December 11, 2013

 

*** Detection of Infectivity in Blood of Persons with Variant and Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease ***

 


 

 2014 CWD UPDATE

 

*** PRICE OF CWD TSE PRION POKER GOES UP 2014 ***

 

Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE PRION update January 2, 2014

 

*** chronic wasting disease, there was no absolute barrier to conversion of the human prion protein.

 

*** Furthermore, the form of human PrPres produced in this in vitro assay when seeded with CWD, resembles that found in the most common human prion disease, namely sCJD of the MM1 subtype.

 

Wednesday, January 01, 2014

 

Molecular Barriers to Zoonotic Transmission of Prions

 

*** chronic wasting disease, there was no absolute barrier to conversion of the human prion protein.

 

*** Furthermore, the form of human PrPres produced in this in vitro assay when seeded with CWD, resembles that found in the most common human prion disease, namely sCJD of the MM1 subtype.

 


 


 

*** The potential impact of prion diseases on human health was greatly magnified by the recognition that interspecies transfer of BSE to humans by beef ingestion resulted in vCJD. While changes in animal feed constituents and slaughter practices appear to have curtailed vCJD, there is concern that CWD of free-ranging deer and elk in the U.S. might also cross the species barrier. Thus, consuming venison could be a source of human prion disease. Whether BSE and CWD represent interspecies scrapie transfer or are newly arisen prion diseases is unknown. Therefore, the possibility of transmission of prion disease through other food animals cannot be ruled out. There is evidence that vCJD can be transmitted through blood transfusion. There is likely a pool of unknown size of asymptomatic individuals infected with vCJD, and there may be asymptomatic individuals infected with the CWD equivalent. These circumstances represent a potential threat to blood, blood products, and plasma supplies.

 


 

Thursday, January 2, 2014

 

*** CWD TSE Prion in cervids to hTGmice, Heidenhain Variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease MM1 genotype, and iatrogenic CJD ??? ***

 

SNIP...

 

Subtype 1: (sCJDMM1 and sCJDMV1)

 

This subtype is observed in patients who are MM homozygous or MV heterozygous at codon 129 of the PrP gene (PRNP) and carry PrPSc Type 1. Clinical duration is short, 3‑4 months.32 The most common presentation in sCJDMM1 patients is cognitive impairment leading to frank dementia, gait or limb ataxia, myoclonic jerks and visual signs leading to cortical blindness (Heidenhain’s syndrome)...

 


 

Animals injected with iatrogenic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease MM1 and genetic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease MM1 linked to the E200K mutation showed the same phenotypic features as those infected with sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease MM1 prions...

 


 

*** our results raise the possibility that CJD cases classified as VV1 may include cases caused by iatrogenic transmission of sCJD-MM1 prions or food-borne infection by type 1 prions from animals, e.g., chronic wasting disease prions in cervid. In fact, two CJD-VV1 patients who hunted deer or consumed venison have been reported (40, 41). The results of the present study emphasize the need for traceback studies and careful re-examination of the biochemical properties of sCJD-VV1 prions. ***

 


 


 

SNIP...SEE FULL TEXT ;

 

Thursday, January 2, 2014

 

*** CWD TSE Prion in cervids to hTGmice, Heidenhain Variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease MM1 genotype, and iatrogenic CJD ??? ***

 


 

Thursday, February 20, 2014

 

Unnecessary precautions BSE MAD COW DISEASE Dr. William James FSIS VS Dr. Linda Detwiler 2014

 


 

 WHAT about the sporadic CJD TSE proteins ?

 

WE now know that some cases of sporadic CJD are linked to atypical BSE and atypical Scrapie, so why are not MORE concerned about the sporadic CJD, and all it’s sub-types $$$

 

Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease CJD cases rising North America updated report August 2013

 

*** Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease CJD cases rising North America with Canada seeing an extreme increase of 48% between 2008 and 2010 ***

 


 

Sunday, October 13, 2013

 

*** CJD TSE Prion Disease Cases in Texas by Year, 2003-2012

 


 

Tuesday, October 05, 2010

 

Large-scale immunohistochemical examination for lymphoreticular prion protein in tonsil specimens collected in Britain

 

05 Oct 2010 14:46

 


 

Friday, February 10, 2012

 

Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) biannual update (2012/1) potential iatrogenic (healthcare-acquired) exposure to CJD, and on the National Anonymous Tonsil Archive

 


 

Monday, August 13, 2012

 

Summary results of the second national survey of abnormal prion prevalence in archived appendix specimens August 2012

 


 

Monday, October 14, 2013

 

*** Researchers estimate one in 2,000 people in the UK carry variant CJD proteins ***

 


 

Thursday, January 23, 2014

 

Medical Devices Containing Materials Derived from Animal Sources (Except for In Vitro Diagnostic Devices) [Docket No. FDA–2013–D–1574]

 


 

Tuesday, February 11, 2014

 

Novant Health Forsyth Medical Center Information on potential CJD exposure

 


 

Thursday, February 06, 2014

 

Commons Science and Technology Committee announce new inquiry on blood, tissue and organ screening Parliament exposure vcjd and blood risk while still ignoring recent risks factors of sporadic CJD

 


 

Friday, February 14, 2014

 

Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) biannual update (February 2014), with briefing on novel human prion disease National CJD Research and Surveillance Unit NCJDRSU

 


 

Friday, January 10, 2014

 

*** vpspr, sgss, sffi, TSE, an iatrogenic by-product of gss, ffi, familial type prion disease, what it ???

 


 

Sunday, January 19, 2014

 

National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined1 as of January 8, 2014

 


 

Sunday, August 09, 2009

 

CJD...Straight talk with...James Ironside...and...Terry Singeltary... 2009

 


 


 


 

CJD QUESTIONNAIRE USA

 


 


 

 

FDA TSEAC CIRCUS AND TRAVELING ROAD SHOW ON THE TSE PRION DISEASE

 

 
Sent: Wednesday, February 05, 2014 9:29 AM
Subject: RE: 8720 FW: Blood, tissue and organ screening SINGELTARY SUBMISSION
 

Dear Mr. Singeltary:
 
Thank you for your recent inquiry to the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER). CBER, one of seven centers within the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), is responsible for the regulation of many biologically-derived products, including blood intended for transfusion, blood components and derivatives, vaccines, allergenic extracts, and cell, tissue and gene therapy products. We hope the following information will be helpful.
 
Currently, there are no TSEAC meetings on the schedule for 2014, but that does not mean there aren’t going to be any meetings this year.  You can sign up for notifications of Advisory Committee meetings at the following website: http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/Calendar/default.htm.  Alternatively, you can check the Advisory Committee Calendar posted on the same page.
 
Additional information is also available through the OC-Advisory Committee Oversight and Management Staff.  For your convenience, I have copied their contact information below:
 
OC-Advisory Committee Oversight and Management Staff 
Food and Drug Administration
10903 New Hampshire Avenue
WO32 - 5129
Silver Spring, MD 20993-0002
Phone:     301-443-0572
Phone:     1-800-741-8138
 
We hope this information has been helpful. 
 
 
Sincerely,
 

Hope Anderson Consumer Safety Officer Consumer Affairs Branch
Division of Communication and Consumer Affairs
Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research
U.S. Food and Drug Administration
Follow us on Twitter: http://www.twitter.com/fdacber
 
This informal communication represents my best judgment at this time. It does not constitute an advisory opinion in accordance with 21 CFR 10.85, and does not necessarily represent the formal position of FDA or otherwise obligate the agency to the views expressed.
 
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [mailto:flounder9@verizon.net]
Sent: Thursday, January 30, 2014 11:05 AM
To: CBER OCOD Consumer Account
Cc: Emery, Bryan (CBER); Monser, Martha;
mmturner@gwu.edu; pschwartz@choc.org; parisi.joseph@mayo.edu; bcaughey@nih.gov; patrick.bosque@dhha.org; APPLEBB@ccf.org

Subject: Fw: Blood, tissue and organ screening SINGELTARY SUBMISSION
 
Greetings FDA TSEAC et al,
 
I am concerned about recent revelations with TSE prion science, disturbing new risk factors, and the fact I see no upcoming TSEAC meetings about these risk factors.
 
could you please tell me when the next TSEAC meeting will be, and if there will be any in 2014, and if you will addressing any of these new risk factors ???
 
Thank You,
 
kind regards,
terry
 


 

 

From: CBER OCOD Consumer Account

 

Sent: Friday, January 13, 2012 3:14 PM

 


 

 

Subject: RE: 5043 FW: TSEAC

 

Dear Mr. Singeltary:

 

Thank you for your recent inquiry to the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER). CBER, one of seven centers within the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), is responsible for the regulation of many biologically-derived products, including blood intended for transfusion, blood components and derivatives, vaccines, allergenic extracts, and cell, tissue and gene therapy products. We hope the following information will be helpful.

 

*** There are no TSEAC meetings on the schedule yet for 2012, but that does not mean there aren’t going to be any meetings this year. You can sign up for notifications of Advisory Committee meetings at the following website: http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/Calendar/default.htm. Alternatively, you can check the Advisory Committee Calendar posted on the same page.

 

On July 29, 2011, FDA published a Public Notice requesting that any consumer organizations interested in participating in the selection of voting and/or nonvoting consumer representatives to serve on its advisory committees or panels, notify FDA in writing. A copy of this Notice is available at the following web address: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-07-29/html/2011-19066.htm. Additional information is also available through the OC-Advisory Committee Oversight and Management Staff. For your convenience, I have copied their contact information below: OC-Advisory Committee Oversight and Management Staff Food and Drug Administration 10903 New Hampshire Avenue

 

WO32 - 5129

 

Silver Spring, MD 20993-0002

 

Phone: 301-443-0572

 

Phone: 1-800-741-8138

 

We hope this information has been helpful.

 

Sincerely,

 

Jill Burkoff

 

Consumer Safety Officer Consumer Affairs Branch Division of Communication and Consumer Affairs Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research US Food and Drug Administration

 

This communication is consistent with 21 CFR 10.85 (k) and constitutes an informal communication that represents my best judgment at this time but does not constitute an advisory opinion, does not necessarily represent the formal position of FDA, and does not bind or otherwise obligate or commit the agency to the views expressed.

 

‘FDA TRAVELING ROAD SHOW’, OR what I call the FDA TRAVELING THREE RING CIRCUS I.E. FDA, USDA, CDC.

 

(8:30 a.m.)

 

CHAIRMAN BROWN: My name is Dr. Paul Brown. Welcome to the FDA traveling road show. We are asked yet once more by the FDA to consider a question of theoretical risk in the absence of sufficient knowledge on which to base any firm conclusion.

 

The issue before us today is that of excluding categories of American blood donors who have either visited or resided for longer periods of time in Great Britain. The issue is sufficiently delicate, as you see that we have been moved outside the Beltway.

 

(Laughter.)

 


 


 


 

TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING

 

Thursday, June 2, 1999

 

CHAIRMAN BROWN: My name is Dr. Paul Brown. Welcome to the FDA traveling road show. We are asked yet once more by the FDA to consider a question of theoretical risk in the absence of sufficient knowledge on which to base any firm conclusion. The issue before us today is that of excluding categories of American blood donors who have either visited or resided for longer periods of time in Great Britain. The issue is sufficiently delicate, as you see that we have been moved outside the Beltway. (Laughter.)snip... "Dr. Alan Williams is employed by the American Red Cross, Holland Labs,and is Scientific Adviser for the Florida Blood Services and Canadian Blood Services. In addition, he has financial interests in firms that could be affected by the general discussions. "Dr. Richard Race has financial interests in firms that could be affected by the general discussions and is a public health science researcher. "In the event that the discussions involve specific products or specific firms for which FDA participants have a financial interest, the participants are aware of the need to exclude themselves from such involvement. And their exclusion will be noted for the public record. A copy of the waivers is available by written request under the Freedom of Information Act. "With respect to all other meeting participants, we ask in the interest of fairness that they address any current or previous financial involvement with any firm whose product they may wish to comment upon." So ends the reading of the conflict of interest statement. Dr. Brown, I turn the meeting over to you.snip...

 


 


 

CJD VOICE

 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 

layperson

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 flounder9@verizon.net